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STATEMENT OF BASIS OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction: This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section 78A-4-103(2)Q).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Appellant asserts the fallowing issues:
Issue 1: Was Appellee JPMorgan Chase Bank, N .A. ("Chase" or
"Appellee")'s as yet unrecorded, purported interest in the property located at
11213 S. Portobello Road, South Jordan, Utah (the "Property"), as an
alleged successor to the Lender, Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp.
("TB W"), void as against a subsequent purchaser who takes the property for
value, without notice? (R. at 7-8, 11-12, 34,105,228).
Determinative law: U.C.A. Sections 57-3-103, 78B-6-1315(4), and
78B-6-1301, et. seq.
Issue 2: Was Appe1lant Chase's alleged prior beneficial interest in
the Property nullified and released by reason of the default judgment granted
by Judge Royal Hansen on December 19, 2011 (the "Default Judgment") as
Appellant could be served by publication in the 2011 quiet title action as an
unknown party, by reason of Appellant's failure to formalize its alleged
beneficial interest until it recorded a Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust
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dated January 31, 2013 (the "Assignment"), on February 6, 2013? (R. at 78, 11, 34, 43, 96-99, 228).
Determinative law: U.C.A. Sections 78B-6-1314, 1315(4), 78B-61301, 78B-6-903.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-36:

57-1-36. Trust deeds -- Instruments entitled to be recorded -Assignment of a beneficial interest.
Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment of a beneficial interest
under a trust deed, notice of assignment of a beneficial interest, notice of
default, trustee's deed, reconveyance of the trust property, and any
instrument by which any trust deed is subordinated or waived as to priority,
if acknowledged as provided by law, is entitled to be recorded. The
recording of an assignment of a beneficial interest under a trust deed or a
notice of assignment of a beneficial interest does not in itself impart notice
of the assignment to the trustor, or the trustor's heirs or personal
representatives, so as to invalidate any payment made by the trustor, or the
trustor's heirs or personal representatives, to the person holding the note,
bond, or other instrument evidencing the obligation by the trust deed.
Utah Code Ann. Section 57-3-103:

57-3-103. Effect of failure to record.
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against
any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a
valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.
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Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-6-903:

78B-6-903. Necessary parties -- Unrecorded rights barred.
A person holding a conveyance from or under the mortgagor or having a
lien on the property, neither of which is properly documented or recorded in
the proper office at the time of the commencement of the action, is not
required to be made a party to the action. The proceedings and any judgment
rendered are conclusive against the party holding the unrecorded conveyance
or lien as if the person had been made a party to the action.
Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-6-1301:

78B-6-1301. Quiet title --Action to determine adverse claim to
property.
A person may bring an action against another person to determine rights,
interests, or claims to or in personal or real property.
Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-6-1314:

78B-6-1314. Service of summons and conclusiveness of judgment.
If service of process is made upon unknown defendants by publication,
the action shall proceed against the unknown persons in the same manner as
against the defendants who are named and upon whom service is made by
publication. Any unknown person who has or claims to have any right, title,
estate, lien, or interest in the property, which is a cloud on the title and
adverse to the plaintiff, who has been served as above, and anyone claiming
under him, shall be concluded by any judgment in the action even though the
unknown person may be under a legal disability.
Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-6-1315(4):

78B-6-1315. Judgment on default -- Court must require evidence -Conclusiveness of judgment.
(4) The judgment shall be conclusive against all the persons named in the
summons and complaint who have been served and against all unknown
persons as stated in the complaint and summons who have been served
by publication.
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STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

This is an appeal from the Third District Court's granting JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. 's Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
On review of a summary judgment, the party against whom the
judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all
the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most favorable
to him. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). This is the
same standard as that applied by the trial court. Briggs v. Holcomb, 740
P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Because disposition of a case on summary judgment denies the benefit
of a trial on the merits, the appellate court must review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the losing party, and affirms only where it appears
there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact, or where, even
according to the facts as contended by the losing party, the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical,
Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The appellate court gives no

deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, which are reviewed for
correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
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STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of Case
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third District Court for the
State of Utah, Case No. 130412969, entitled "Order Granting Summary
Judgment in Favor of Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.".

Course of Proceedings
Judge Royal Hansen granted a quiet title default judgment on
December 19, 2011, case no. 100920234, as to a trust deed encumbering the
Property which was dated April 19, 2007 ("Trust Deed") and which named
TBW as Lender. (R. at 7-8). Notwithstanding this default judgment, Chase
recorded an Assignment on February 6, 2013, challenging the validity of the
default judgment as to itself, and claiming it had the right to foreclose on the
Property by reason of the same Trust Deed. (R. at 11 ). This action was filed
by Sterling Fiduciaries, LLC, trustee of Stone Unturned Trust "(Sterling"),
which had purchased the Property from Kimberly A. McCrae and Kip L.
McRae (the "McRaes") on August 24, 2011. (R. at 105).

Disposition in Lower Court
In the instant action below, Chase made a motion for summary
judgment on September 4, 2014. (R. at 26). This motion was unopposed,
and the lower court granted Chase summary judgment. (R. at 165-166).

8

New counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Sterling timely filed a motion for a new
trial under Rule 59 (R. at 170), and the court vacated its prior ruling and
gave Sterling until December 5, 2014 by which to respond to Chase's
motion for summary judgment. (R. at 183). After Sterling's opposition and
Chase's reply, the court heard argument on February 18, 2015. (R. at 253).
Notwithstanding Sterling's objection to the proposed order (R. at 269), the
court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant/Appellee Chase on
March 30, 2015. Plaintiff/Appellant Sterling timely filed a Notice of Appeal
on April 22, 2015.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. On April 19, 2007, McRaes executed a promissory note in favor of
TBW in the original principle amount of $900,000.00 (the "Note") for a loan
that they would use to purchase the Property. (R. at 46).
2. The Nate was secured by the Property, as evidenced by a Trust Deed.

(R. at 51).
3. The Trust Deed named TBW as Lender, McRae as Borrower, First
American Title as Trustee, and MERS as beneficiary and nominee for
Lender. (R. at 51).
4. According to the MERS Milestones provided by Appellee Chase's
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counsel, TBW registered the Note and Trust Deed on May 15, 2007 naming
itself as investor, and MERS then transferred the beneficial interest of the
Trust Deed from TBW to "New Investor: 1003646 Bank of America,
National Association, Trustee/Custodian for WAMU/WMMSC" on
September 7, 2007. (R. at 69).
5. TBW then transferred its servicing rights for the Note and Trust Deed
to "FDIC as Receiver for Washington Mutual Bank", which also named
TBW as the "Old Servicer", on October 4, 2007. (R. at 69).
6. FDIC, "as Receiver for Washington Mutual Bank", then transferred
its servicing rights to the new servicer, "JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. fka
WAMU" on March 31, 2009. (R. at 69).
7. Bank of America, National Assoc. Trustee/Custodian for
WAMU/WMMSC, then apparently transferred its beneficial rights to "JP
Morgan Chase Bank N.A. tka WAMU" on May 27, 2010 (R. at 69), all
without any recording of a change of interest with the Salt Lake County
Recorder or putting McRaes on notice of the same. (R. at 69).
8. On October 19, 2010, McRaes filed a quiet title action, case no.
100920234, naming TBW as defendant, in an action to determine an adverse
claim to McRaes' Property under U.C.A. Section 78B-6-1301. (R. at 9699).
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9. Consistent with paragraph 15 of the Trust Deed, only TBW, as Lender
on the Trust Deed, was given notice ofMcRae's quiet title action. (R. at
60).
10.McRaes transferred their interests in the Property to Appellant
Sterling on August 24, 2011 (R. at 105), after serving all unknown parties in
the quiet title action by publication on at least two separate occasions, on
May 24, 2011 and July 22, 2011. (R. at 228, para. 6).
11. A Default Judgment was granted to McRaes by Judge Royal Hansen
on December 19, 2011 which, consistent with the Default Judgment and
language in the First Amended Complaint which it referenced, quieted title
"by nullifying and releasing the trust deeds clouding title" to McRae' s
Property. (R. at 98, 107-108).
12.McRaes recorded a Quit Claim Deed that transferred the Property to
Appellant Sterling on September 22, 2011, and recorded their Default
Judgment at the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on January 10, 2012.
(R. at 105, 107-108).
13.McRaes apparently continued making monthly payments on the Note
through October, 2012. (R. at 43, para. 12).
14.Appellee Chase finally made public its purported Assignment of the
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beneficial interest under the Trust Deed it allegedly received from MERS,
"AS NOMINEE FOR [TBW], ITS SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS ... " on

r,

\l:lil

February 6, 2013, despite MERS having already transferred the beneficial
interest it once had as nominee for TBW and its successors to Bank of
America National Association, as Trustee, in paragraph 4, above. (R. at 85).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant seeks to reverse the ruling of the Third District Court,
which "found no genuine issue of any material fact and Chase is granted
summary judgment in its favor as a matter of law on all of Plaintiffs claims
in this action." Despite the specific direction of Section 57-1-36, U.C.A.
that "[ a]ny ... assignment of a beneficial interest under a trust deed ... if
acknowledged as provided by law, is entitled to be recorded", and the
limitations of an unrecorded interest as to subsequent purchasers for value,
without notice under Section 57-3-103 U .C.A., Appellee failed to provide
public notice of its alleged prior beneficial ownership interest under the
Trust Deed until recording its Assignment on February 6, 2013. Until then,
Appellant's predecessor, the McRaes, had no obligation to provide notice to
Appellee of their quiet title action.
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Only TBW, the Lender on the Note and Trust Deed, was entitled to
notice according to the Trust Deed notice provision at pargraph 15 thereof,
and only TBW was properly named as a defendant in McRaes' quiet title
action because there were no other parties of record with an alleged
ownership interest in 2011. Therefore, Appellee's claim of a prior beneficial
interest in 2010 was void as against Appellant, which purchased McRaes'
Property for value, in good faith and without notice of Appellee's purported
claim. Appellant also promptly recorded its Quitclaim Deed from McRaes.
And under Section 78B-6-1315(4) U.C.A., a default judgment is
''conclusive against all persons named in the summons and complaint who
have been served and against all unknown persons as stated in the

complaint and summons who have been served by publication." Id.,
emphasis added. Here, Appellee was not entitled to be named in the quiet
title complaint or served because it had no documented beneficial ownership
interest outside of the guarded MERS Milestones, and MERS is not
challenging the default judgment, nor is it represented by counsel in this
action.
ARGUMENT

I.

Chase's only interest in the Property, other than that as a servicer, is
due to an apparent Assignment in 2013 which is void as against any
subsequent purchaser for value, in good faith, without notice.
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Assignments of beneficial interest are effective as to subsequent third
party good faith purchasers for value, when notice of the same is made
public through the appropriate county recorder's office. Duffy Daugherty,
Michigan State's football coach from 1954 to 1972, was quoted as saying, "I
could have been a Rhodes Scholar, except for my grades." Likewise,
Appellee could have been assured of notice of McRaes' quiet title action,
and could have prevailed against the Appellant, a subsequent good faith
purchaser for value and without notice of Appellee's claim, had Appellee
only published notice of its alleged beneficial interest when it purportedly
acquired it in May, 2010. But for nearly three years thereafter, Appellee
recorded nothing. No one was put on notice of Appellee 's alleged interest.
When the Assignment dated January 31, 2013 was finally recorded,
the purpose given by counsel for Appellee was "merely to formalize and
record of record the earlier assignment to [Appellee]." (R. at 33, last two
lines). That formality was critical in protecting Appellee's claim as against
Appellant. Instead, there was no hint to any third parties of notice of an
earlier alleged assignment of beneficial interest to Appellee from the public
record, nor any letter to McRaes from Appellee, the servicer of their Note.
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In support of its argument below, Appellee cited Gregerson v. Jensen,
669 P.2d 396, 397 (Utah 1983). (R. at 34). Gregerson discusses Utah's
statute on the effect of failure to record, U.C.A. Section 57-3-103:
"Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as
against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of
it, if:
(l)The subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and
for a valuable consideration; and
(2) The subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded."
Id. at 398.

In Gregerson, the buyers did not qualify for protection afforded
certain subsequent purchasers under U.C.A. Section 57-3-103 because they
did not record their own conveyance (or contract). Id. at 398. However,
Appellant here promptly recorded its Quitclaim Deed from McRaes, and
Mc Raes promptly recorded their default judgment, all ahead of Appellee' s
2013 Assignment, as evidenced in the record. (R. at 105, 107-108).
Appellant is entitled to the protections of Section 57-3-103.

It is undisputed that Appellee failed to timely publish notice of its
purported beneficial interest in the Property until February 6, 2013. The
MERS Milestones were not available to McRaes or Appellant before
counsel for Appellee made the same available by attaching it to the motion
for summary judgment in 2014. The records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder clearly revealed that TBW was the Lender and the still apparent
15

owner of the relevant Note to whom McRaes' obligation was owed.
Regardless of MERS' alleged beneficial interest under the Trust Deed as a
nominee for TBW, paragraph 15 of the Trust Deed is clear that notice is only
required to be given to Lender, being TBW, and not its nominee or anyone
else named in the transaction. Without diligence in recording critical
documents such as assignments of beneficial interests under the Trust Deed,
a purported unrecorded beneficial interest is void as to a subsequent third
party purchaser for value, in good faith without notice, that promptly acts,
according to U.C.A. Section 57-3-103.
This is the case with Appellant. Appellant learned that McRaes might
soon have a default judgment against their disinterested Lender, TBW.
Based on the recorded documents pertaining to the Property, Appellant
purchased McRaes' Property for valuable consideration, in good faith and
without notice of any claim of beneficial interest by Appellee. And
Appellant thereafter promptly recorded its Quitclaim Deed to the Property.
The Trust Deed under which Appellee claims a beneficial interest was
nullified and removed pursuant to a default judgment order of the Third
District Court, after at least two publications of notice to all unknown
persons who may claim an interest in Appellant's Property.
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II. Chase was effectively served by publication in the 2011 quiet title
action because its beneficial interest under a Corporate Assignment of
Deed of Trust was not recorded until February 6, 2013.
Appellee successfully claimed below that Appellant's claim should
fail because the default judgment granted by Judge Royal Hansen "did not
quiet title as to Chase's interest in the Property." (R. at 34). Quoting Utah
Code Section 78B-6-1315(4), Appellee argued that a quiet title order is only
"conclusive against all the persons named in the summons and complaint
who have been served and against all unknown persons as stated in the
complaint and summons who have been served by publication." Id.
(Emphasis added by counsel for Appellee, R. at 34).
The parties hereto agree that neither Appellee nor the Lender TB W's
nominee, MERS, were named in the quiet title action; however, in 2010 and
2011, when that action was progressing, neither MERS, as a nominee for
TBW, nor Appellee had any independently recorded ownership interest in
the Note or Trust Deed which pertained to the Property. According to the
MERS Milestones provided by Appellee's counsel, MERS had conveyed its
original beneficial interest under the Trust Deed back in 2007, and had no
further interest, as a nominee ofTBW or otherwise. Only Appellee's
alleged beneficial interest is the subject of this action. MERS is not
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contesting a lack of notice of the McRaes' default judgment, and is not
represented in this proceeding.
Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-6-1314 also defines under what
circumstances notice to unknown defendants by publication can be
accomplished:

78B-6-1314. Service of summons and conclusiveness of judgment.
If service of process is made upon unknown defendants by publication,
the action shall proceed against the unknown persons in the same manner as
against the defendants who are named and upon whom service is made by
publication. Any unknown person who has or claims to have any right, title,
estate, lien, or interest in the property, which is a cloud on the title and
adverse to the plaintiff, who has been served as above, and anyone claiming
under him, shall be concluded by any judgment in the action even though the
unknown person may be under a legal disability.
Emphasis added.

McRaes only obtained their default judgment after

publishing notice to unknown defendants twice. (R. at 228, para. 6).
Likewise, Appellant had no knowledge of a purported beneficial interest
now claimed by Appellee. Appellee's claim should be concluded by Judge
Hansen's Default Judgment of December 19, 2011, as an assignee claiming
under TBW, who received service of process and simply failed to respond.
Appellee cited in the lower court, Jackson Construction Company,

Inc. v. Robert C. Marrs, et. al., 100 P.3d 1211, 1214 (Utah 2004) for the
proposition that "Utah courts have repeatedly held that when a quiet title
order is obtained through a default judgment, and it is later revealed that
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service was not properly effectuated on the parties-in-interest, the quiet title
order is void." Id. (R. at 34). Unlike the instant action involving Appellee's
unrecorded alleged beneficial ownership interest, Jackson Construction
Company, Inc. involved a failure to serve even the owners of record in an

adverse possession default judgment. Here, Appellee has no choice but to
seek a non-judicial foreclosure to defend its alleged security interest in the
Property. If this was a judicial foreclosure, Section 78B-6-903 states that
unrecorded interests of alleged lienholders should be ignored. (R. at 270).
After the alleged 2007 assignment by MERS which was only
disclosed in the MERS Milestones, MERS had then transferred its beneficial
interest. It had no more interest in the Property to convey, as a nominee of
TBW or otherwise.
These issues should be resolved in favor of Appellant, because a
summary judgment was granted Appellee. On appeal, Appellant is entitled
to have all the facts presented, and all inferences fairly arising therefrom,
considered in a light most favorable to him. Winegar v. Froerer, 813 P.2d
104 (Utah 1991).
CONCLUSION
The Third District Court's grant of summary judgment to Appellee
...)

should be reversed, and the Court of Appeals should determine that the
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default judgment granted by Judge Royal Hansen on December 19, 2011 is
valid as to unknown persons served twice by publication, and that Appellee
is one of those unknown parties. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals should
find that Appellant is a subsequent purchaser of the Property for value, in
good faith and without notice of Appellee's claim, and that Appellant's
timely recording of its interest renders void Appellee's subsequent
Assignment as to Appellant. Appellee should not be allowed to deprive
Appellant of its Property, or the value thereof.
DATED: September 15, 2015.

Dwight pers
Attorney for Appellant Sterling Fiduciaries, LLC,
Trustee of Stone Unturned Trust.

G
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Dwight Epperson, certify that on September 15, 2015, I served two
copies of the attached Appellant's Brief upon J. Tayler Fox and James D.
Gilson, counsel for the Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to them by first
class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address:
James D. Gilson
J. Tayler Fox
Callister Nebeker & McCullough
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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In the Utah Court of Appeals case of Sterling Fiduciaries, LLC,

Plaintiff/Appellant, v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Case No. 20150358, no
Addendum is required under Rule 24(a)(ll) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

Counsel for Appellant is relying upon the 30 page limit for briefs.

Dated: September 17, 2015

DwtglEpp\ierso
Dwight J.L. Epperson Inc.
Attorney for Appellant Sterling Fiduciaries, LLC

